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This article provides insights into Cameroon’s crisis management of the coronavirus pandemic via an exploratory 
and descriptive qualitative research. Thematic analysis of data was done using a framework approach; the 
Comprehensive Pandemic Risk Management System (CPRMS) underpins the research and provided structure, 
order, and clarity to the article. From the findings, one can deduce that the government is working hard to mitigate 
the potentially awful consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. The authorities implemented temporary 
containment and infection control measures to stem virus spread and have relied heavily on international and 
humanitarian organisations for financial/technical help to operationalise the pandemic response. Attempts to 
control the spread of the virus, however, have been challenging. Deficiencies abound in many areas including 
slowness to institute containment measures after the first infected cases; Cameroon’s fragile/weak health 
infrastructure; insufficient critical care units and health workers disproportionately distributed in the country; 
safety concerns with insufficient protective equipment for health workers; overly centralised pandemic response 
at the national level to the detriment of the regions and lower administrative units; government politicising the 
response by refusing contributions/donations from opposition parties; high cost for COVID-19 treatment limiting 
access to healthcare and insufficient trust in health systems ability to deal with COVID-19. Recommendations are 
supplied on how to improve the coronavirus response as infections skyrocket. The recommendations also 
address enhancing later epidemics/pandemics and Cameroon’s health system.  













1.0 INTRODUCTION  
Responding effectively to an unprecedented health crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic with 
several “unknown unknowns” is a daunting task for several governments. Uncertainty plagues 
strategic governance decisions amid coronavirus crisis. Yet, publics expect the authorities to 
live up to expectations especially when the crisis is transboundary and involves rapidly 
metamorphosing events (Ola & Zeger, 2020). In such complicated and ambiguous situations, 
developing countries plagued with problems of governance may be entangled in policy 
paralysis and do not fully appreciate the unfolding risk which could lead to disastrous 
consequences (Idowu, 2020).  
The coronavirus pandemic threatens to disproportionately affect the least developed countries 
with potentially dire consequences for human health and the economy (UN, 2020; World Bank, 
2020b). The West Africa Ebola epidemic that quickly over-whelmed the health systems of  
Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia is a fresh reminder of the vulnerability of developing 
countries to epidemics (Moon, et al., 2015). Many African countries have fragile health systems 
not well-equipped to deal with COVID-19 (Bang et al., 2020). For instance, 10 African 
countries have no ventilators while just 2,000 ventilators are available for the 41 least-resourced 
African countries (Maclean & Marks, 2020). Hence the ramifications of the pandemic could be 
profound and long-lasting in the continent where the health systems of most African countries 
are permanently in crisis (Waal, 2020), worsened by weak governance (Idowu, 2020).  
Governance policies in response to epidemic diseases in many African countries could affect 
governance more than the epidemics themselves. For instance, infection control measures 
during epidemics could be unpopular creating mistrust that could lead to resistance in the 
population. This was the case  in 2014 during the Ebola virus when the Liberian government’s 
attempted to lockdown the capital Monrovia resulted to fierce resistance (Moon, et al., 2015). 
Just like in Sierra Leone and Guinea, conspicuous governance challenges existed in national 
coordination of the Ebola epidemic response including fast detection,  infection tracing, basic 
care, and quarantine  of patients (Madhav, 2018). Furthermore, enforcing lockdown or infection 
control measures through health-related emergency powers often lead to accusations of abuse 
of power  (Waal, 2020). 
Managing the coronavirus pandemic in Africa would require innovative governance 
approaches. The WHO provided the International Health Regulations (IHR) that sets a 
framework for countries to detect, monitor, report and respond to infectious disease outbreaks 
(WHO, 2008). Despite these efforts, progress towards achieving the IHR has been slow in 
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developing countries where serious inadequacy in pandemic preparedness, governance, 
leadership, and  funding abound (Looke, et al,  2015; Damme, et al., 2018). Consequently, the 
WHO underscored the relevance of research into the role of governance in public health 
emergencies in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2018a). This research endeavour 
make a modest contribution to this end by exploring Cameroon’s governance of the COVID-
19 pandemic since the country is one of the most affected in Africa (OCHA, 2020).  
This research seeks to examine the COVID-19 pandemic crisis management in Cameroon with 
the overarching aim of  assessing the role of governance in the overall crisis response. The 
central goal is to understand whether Cameroon’s governance strategy would be able to 
engineer an effective health response as the health crisis prolongs. The outcome of the research 
has informed recommendations for improvements in the subsequent response to the crisis.  
2.0 BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CAMEROON’S HEALTH PROFILE 
Cameroon’s risk profile is overburdened with health hazards including natural, potentially 
socio-natural, technological, social, and anthropogenic hazards (Figure 1B; Bang et al., 2019). 
Cameroon is a Lower Middle-Income bilingual country (English and French as official 
languages) found along the Atlantic Ocean between Central and West Africa with a population 
of around 26 million people (2019 estimate) spread over 10 administrative regions ( Figure 1A). 
The country has a poverty rate of 44.7% and life expectancy of 58.9 years at birth (World Bank, 
2020a).  
  
A   B 
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Figure 1: Maps of Cameroon (A) showing the 10 administrative regions and their capital 
cities and (B) Location of the main hazards in the country. Sources:(A) Ndi and Kimengsi 
(2017) and (B) Bang et al. (2019).  
 
2.1 Cameroon’s health structure 
Prior to independence in 1960, Cameroon’s health system was designed to serve the colonial 
administrators in urban areas to the detriment of rural areas where most of the populace lived 
(Molem, 2008). After signing the Alma Ata Declaration (AAD) in 1982 that introduced primary 
health care reforms, the government has pursued a decentralised health policy albeit with 
limited implementation (WHO, 2016). Theoretically, Cameroon’s health system is structured 
to work at three levels (Central, Intermediate and Peripheral) following a top down hierarchical 
order (Table 1). The co-financing of primary health care between the government and the 
community, as enshrined in the AAD is skewed with the latter bearing most of the cost ( around 
70.4% of the health expenditure; WHO, 2016). Hence, most Cameroonians cannot afford the 
excessive cost of health care, including health insurance (Nde et al., 2019), restricting access to 
health services including treatment for COVID-19 (HRW, 2020).  
Table 1: The top-down structure of Cameroon’s Health System.  
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ACRONYMS:  NCPEDMS=National Centre for the Procurement of Essential Drugs and Medical Supplies, 
HCRHRES=Hospital Centre for Research ,Human Reproduction and Endoscopy Surgery, NLQCDV=National 
Laboratory for the Quality Control of Drugs and Valuation, CBRS=Chantal Biya International Research Centre, 
CPC=Centre Pasteur of Cameroon, NPHO=National Public Health Observatory 
Source: Adapted from WHO (2016), MPH (2016), Zamo-Akono et al. (2013) 











The burden of communicable diseases is largely driven by HIV/AIDs, malaria and tuberculosis, 
while others like diarrheal diseases, respiratory tract infections, hepatitis A/E, 
typhoid/dengue/yellow fever, African trypanosomiasis, plague, cutaneous leishmaniasis, 
schistosomiasis, sexually transmissible infections, meningococcal meningitis, rabies, buruli 
ulcer, Onchocerciasis, geo-helminthiases, rubella, diphtheria, measles, mumps, neonatal 
tetanus, pertussis also occur across the county. The chronic non communicable diseases are 
diabetes, cancers (cervical, breast, prostrate), cardiovascular diseases (hypertension) and 
respiratory diseases (wheeze, asthma) including road traffic/unintentional accidents prominent 
in urban centers (Echouffo-Tcheugui & Kengue, 2011; WHO, 2016; Papia et al., 2020). 
Generally, the country has experienced a general decrease in disease burden from 1990-2017 
although the rate of decrease for non-communicable diseases has been slower than others 
(Roser & Ritchie , 2020) 
2.3 Cameroon’s health system performance 
An evaluation of Cameroon’s Health Sector Performance (HSP) for fifteen years (2001-2015) 
was done in 2015 based on key health indicators and targeted Health System Strategies (HSS). 
The which paints a bleak picture of Cameroon’s HSP and provide an insight into Cameroon’s 
health system and its capability to sustain the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The public health infrastructure and equipment are not enough and disproportionately 
distributed across the country leaving District Hospitals with the least resources. The ratio of 
health personnel (doctors, nurses, midwife, technicians,  pharmacist etc.) to the population 
remains exceptionally low (WHO, 2016). There is stagnation in public funding, life expectancy 
and regression in areas of maternal mortality, disease control and family planning. The life 
expectancy at birth in Cameroon was 57.3 in 2015, which is lower than the average for sub-
Saharan Africa (60 years) and the world (71.4 years) (NOPH/MPH, 2017).  
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) have been increasing in the country and accounted for a 
sizable proportion of all fatalities in 2014 (Agbor & Tambi, 2014).  Communicable diseases 
were responsible for a considerable amount of disease burden and deaths in 2013. Not all is 
gloom though! Considerable progress has been made to reverse the spread of HIV/AID and 
many more people have access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation. Yellow fever 
immunization coverage increased from 64.8% to 85.8% (WHO, 2016; MPH, 2016 2017).  
Overall, Cameroon has not achieved  the objectives of the HSP due to improper management 
of financial resources and information, deficient performance of the health sectors, lack of an 
integrated monitoring/evaluation plan, and  deficient  accountability methods/processes (WHO, 
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2016). These deficiencies have implications for the governance and effective response to the 
COVID-19  pandemic.  
3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: COMPREHENSIVE PANDEMIC RISK 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (CPRMS)  
 
A novel conceptual framework, the Comprehensive Pandemic Risk Management System 
(CPRMS) model (Studzinski, 2020) has provided orientation, structure and focus to the article 
(Potschin-Young, et al., 2018). The CPRMS is underpinned by governance elements suitable 
to gauge epidemic/pandemic response; is grounded in empirical evidence; adopts a 
multisectoral/multidisciplinary approach; takes an integrated approach to pandemic risk 
management; embraces a risk management approach; integrate prevention, preparedness, and 
response measures and has secular scope (Studzinski, 2020). 
Indeed, the CPRMS supports a well-coordinated and organized effort to implement operational 
policies, plans and strategies from the  local to global level. The framework has three core 
components (see Figure 3): (1) pandemic risk spectrum in hierarchical order; (2) critical 
infrastructure and essential services and (3) a multisectoral institutional framework 
underpinned by six strategic system building blocks (SBB). The six SBBs are  (1) 
Governance/Leadership and Coordination; (2) Human Resources; (3) Financing; (4) 
Information systems (coordinated generation and distribution of data, information, knowledge); 
(5) Operational Interventions/Service Delivery and (6) Essential Commodities/Logistics.  
The model encapsulates a broad view of interrelated and interconnected global, national, and 
regional dimensions with each geographic realm having its own internal coherence 
strengthened by the six component building blocks. The relevance and application of the 
CPRMS to this article anchors on the national geographic realm that applies to a country 
(Cameroon in this research) in consideration of the six component building blocks along the 
“Institutional System” axis (Figure 2). The CPRMS, therefore, provides theoretical/conceptual 
and practical understanding and guidance on pandemic crisis management with underlying 
governance strategic management. Hence, its application to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis 






4.0 METHODOLOGY  
This research is principally qualitative, exploratory, and descriptive (Reiter, 2017) to unveil 
initial insights into Cameroon’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic. Initial attempts to 
collect empirical data from senior/top government officials dealing with the pandemic response 
was difficult. Other than their hectic schedules which does not provide much room to grant 
interviews, the authorities are reluctant to comment on governance strategies they perceive to 
be dynamic in response to the evolving pandemic crisis. Hence primary/secondary data were 
used to inform this research.  
In circumstances where collecting empirical data is difficult, primary information becomes an 
invaluable source of data especially in unfolding incidents (Kabir, 2016) like the COVID-19 
pandemic. Government primary sources of data on COVID-19 management was obtained from 
government/official policies, plans and programmes;  inter-agency/ministerial press briefings, 
reports, circulars, guidelines, communiques, and statements published on the websites of 
stakeholder government agencies/ministries—MPH, Ministry of Territorial Administration 
(MTA); Ministry of Communication (MCOM), Ministry of Transport (MT), Ministry of 
Telecommunication (MTEL) etcetera.  
The COVID-19 policies, plans, programs, project, and country/situation report of international 
and humanitarian agencies liaising with the Cameroon government to combat COVID-19 
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complemented the primary data sources. Notable are the World Health Organisation (WHO), 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),  UN’s Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), International Organisation of Migration (IOM); World Food 
Programme (WFP), Cameroon Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC), International Medical Corps (IMC), Central Emergency Response 
Fund (CERF), French Red Cross (FRC), Lutheran World Federation (LWF) Médecins Sans 
Frontieres (MSF) etcetera. These ministries, agencies and organisations have regularly 
uploaded COVID-19 documents and reports on their websites that informed the research 
(Hammarberg et al., 2016; Rapley, 2016;  Bhattacherjee, 2012).  
Secondary data was obtained from scholarly articles and grey-literature sources. The paucity of 
the former is noticeable since the pandemic is just a few months old, thereby, underlining the 
relevance of grey sources (local, national and international media ) to inform knowledge on the 
unfolding crisis (White, et al., 2013; Hammarberg et al., 2016). Content analysis was used to 
peruse and categorise the data sources into relevant themes (Bryman, 2004) guided by the SBBs 
of the CPRMS framework.  
5.0 FINDINGS 
The six component SBBs of the Institutional System in the CPRMS (see Figure 2) informed 
the thematic analysis and have elicited knowledge on the pandemic  response presented in the 
findings.  
 
5.1 Governance of the COVID-19 response 
The governance aspects discussed in this section are leadership, institutional arrangements and 
administrative decisions, briefings and decentralisation.  
 
5.1.1 Leadership  
Cameroon’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic is under the leadership of the President of 
the Republic, delegated to the Prime Minister (PM), Head of Government. Efforts to convince 
the population that the government is fully in charge of the pandemic managements was 
undermined from the top of the governance structure. Cameroon’s 87-year-old President was 
not seen or heard from for 35 days after the Prime Minister (PM) announced government’s 
initial measures to tackle the pandemic on March 17, 2020. This was a critical period at the 
beginning of the pandemic when citizens all over the world were getting assurance from their 
presidents and daily briefings on measures to combat the virus. Due to  pressure from the main 
opposition party, the president addressed the nation for the first time on April 16 amidst heavy 
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criticisms from Cameroonians for being quiet and widespread speculations on social media 
about reasons for his prolonged absence despite the country being one of the hardest hit by 
COVID-19  in Africa (Krishnan, 2020).  
 
5.1.2 Institutional arrangements 
The Cameroon government’s response strategy for the COVID-19 pandemic is in accordance 
with the administrative governance of the country by different echelons of government at the 
national, regional, and local (Divisional/District) levels. The PM heads an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee in charge of monitoring and evaluating the implementation of government’s 
response strategy to the coronavirus pandemic (Republic of Cameroon, 2020c). The Ministry 
of Public Health (MPH) is the lead agency responsible for coordination the coronavirus 
response strategy and policy at the national level. Stakeholder ministries liaising with the MPH 
include MTA, MCOM, MT, MTEL etcetera. In accordance with Cameroon’s top-down 
administrative governance structure, the ten Regional Delegates of Public Health and 
stakeholder ministries are responsible for COVID-19 management in their areas of authority. 
Operationally, the regions/districts are not enhanced and sufficiently empowered to manage the 
COVID-19 response (UNICEF, 2020).  
 
5.1.3 Administrative decisions 
The first cases of COVID-19 in Cameroon was reported on March 6, 2020 and since then, the 
Cameroon government has progressively implemented a series of containment measures. The 
first official government response via the PM on March 17, 2020 saw the announcement of a 
set of 13 measures to mitigate the virus spread. In less than two months after the initial 
measures, the number of infections had skyrocketed to 2,077, with 245 deaths (Worldometer, 
2020) indicating an exponential increase in the number of cases. The real number of 
cases/deaths are far higher because diagnosis is inadequate with limited coverage all over the 
country (Bang et al., 2020; OCHA, 2020). Subsequent restrictive measures, decrees, policies, 
plans had been announced to complement the initial measures (see Table 2) albeit most were 








Table 2: The main COVID-19 strategies, policies, plans, or actions taken by the government 
from March-July 2020.  

















Coordinate COVID-19 activities in the public and private sectors. 
Ensure resources for managing the pandemic are used efficiently. 
Ensure transparency in managing resources for the pandemic response. 
Creation of $1 billion COVID-19 response solidarity fund on April 1, 2020. 
President’s appeal for Cameroonians to respect government’s response measures. 
Decentralisation of the COVID-19 response to the regions on April 20th, 2020.  
Order prohibiting the raising of funds for  the pandemic without authorisation from the MTA. 
Ministerial order to close accounts opened to raise funds for the pandemic without from the MTA. 

























Cameroon’s land, air and sea borders were temporarily closed.  
Implementation of COVID-19 safety/preventive measures at  points of entry into Cameroon.  
Temporary stop of visa issuing at all entry points into the Cameroon. 
Travelers entering Cameroon mandated to complete a health declaration form.  
Temporary suspension of Cameroon’s para-public sector/diplomatic missions abroad.  
Restrictive border measures allowed  essential goods/essential into the country.  
No restrictions on internal transport to allow circulation of essential services and goods.  



















Face masks made  mandatory in all public spaces and means of  transport.  
Temporary closure of all educational/training institutions and sporting activities throughout the 
country. 
Sanctioning of populace that fail to respect restrictive/confinement measures. 
Temporary prohibition of gatherings of more than fifty people throughout the country. 
Opening times for restaurants, bars and  entertainment facilities restricted to 6 pm.  
Business premises to implement infection control measures.  
Public administrations urged to have virtual/digital meetings.  
Pledge for search of COVID-19 patients through massive testing. 
Raising awareness about the pandemic via many platforms and sources 
Setup of  emergency COVID-19 toll-free hotline number (1510)  
Presidential decree of April 15, 2020 commuting and remitting prison sentences.  
Set up of  few quarantine and treatment centers in some regional capitals.  
Requisition of private health facilities essential  to implement COVID-19 response.  
Order from the Governor of the Littoral Region prohibiting on-the-spot consumption of drinks.  
Order from SDO of  Menoua Division prohibiting  corpses from entering his Division and the burial 











s  Specialized treatment centers to be established in the regional capitals.  
Establishing and increasing  testing in all the 10 regions of the country.  
Sensitisation to be done in Cameroon’s official and vernacular/indigenous languages.  
Pledge to  intensity COVID-19 screening, and awareness raising campaigns, acquire essential 
hospital equipment and encourage local production of essential COVIC-19 materials.  
Source: Author, compiled from various sources including Republic of Cameroon 
(2020a,b,c), MPH (2020b,c ), OCHA (2020), UNICEF (2020), MTA (2020), Epok (2020), 
Djene (2020), SDO (2020a,b) 
 
5.1.4 Crisis Management Briefing  
The Minister of Public Health have held several meetings with other government, local and 
international stakeholders in the public and private sectors, including international and 
humanitarian agencies and the diplomatic services to address the COVID-19 response (OCHA, 
2020; CRTV, 2020a). At the onset of the response, there were daily briefings mostly in French 
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on the rapidly evolving coronavirus epidemiological situation concerning infection rates, cured 
cases, fatalities, and government strategy. The regular briefings, however, were stopped 
abruptly less than three months after the containment measures and the Minister reverted to 
providing information online via the MPH’s website. Whilst the reason to stop open press 
briefing was not mentioned, sceptics believe it may be related to concealing the higher death 
toll from the virus (APA, 2020).  
 
5.1.5 Decentralisation  
Government’s decentralisation strategy is aimed to optimize the autonomous management of 
the pandemic in all the 10 regions of the country for rapid and efficient care of patients since 
the limited critical care and testing facilities were overly centralised in Yaoundé and Douala. 
In consultation with civil society actors, parliamentarians and other international stakeholders 
assisting in the pandemic response, the government announced a series of measures to 
decentralise the pandemic management to the regional/local levels on April 9, 2020. Notable,  
was the establishment of treatment centers for COVID-19 patients in all the 10 regional capitals 
(Republic of Cameroon, 2020a). The decentralisation strategy, theoretically, could enhance 
regional/local response to the pandemic. Its success, however, will depend on government’s 
political commitment to provide the required health resources/facilities.  
 
5.2 Resources		for	COVID-19	response 
The resources addressed here are health/human resources and financial/material resources.  
5.2.1 Health facilities/ human resources 
Cameroon’s health infrastructure/facilities are inadequate (Cabrol, 2018) and unsuitable to 
effectively respond to the COVID-19 pandemic (Bang et al., 2020). The  health infrastructure 
is acutely inadequate and disproportionately distributed in the country (HRW, 2020; OCHA, 
2020). An assessment of Cameroon’s public health infrastructure shows that 30.1 % of the 
medical facilities are either in Yaoundé or Douala (WHO, 2016). Indeed, the health facilities in 
Yaoundé and Douala are servicing 34.5% of Cameroon’s population (based on the 2015 
population of around 20,504,419. More than half of the pharmacies in the country and 
specialised services such as Ophthalmology, Hemodialysis and Imaging units are either absent 
or poorly distributed around the country (WHO, 2016). The inadequate, limited, and 
disproportionate distribution of the health facilities limits health care accessibility to 




5.2.2 Financing/material resources 
Research evidence suggests the Cameroon government needs substantial financial and technical 
assistance to fight the coronavirus pandemic (Bang et al., 2020). Consequently, the government 
created a National Solidarity Fund to finance the pandemic operations (MTA, 2020) and the 
MPH, launched a website to receive public donations (MPH, 2020a). Assistance has been 
pouring in from many sectors (Table 3). In early May 2020, the IMF, under its Rapid Credit 
Facility (RCF), disbursed US$ 226 million to the Cameroon Government to aid in the 
coronavirus combat (IMF, 2020). Despite the assistance, medical facilities continue to 
experience shortages in basic hospital goods for COVID-19 treatment like glasses, gloves, 
masks, disinfectants, protective gear for nurses/doctors, thermometers, medicines including 
ventilators and oxygen (HRW, 2020; Bang et al., 2020).  
Table 3: Some sources of donations/help for the pandemic response in Cameroon.  
Source  of Assistance Support/Assistance  Provided 
WHO  Medical consignment and capacity development  for health workers. 
OCHA Capacity development (training/recruitment) for health workers. 
CERF and UNDP Protective gear (medical masks) for health workers. 
Chinese Billionaire  Large consignment of medical equipment. 
UNDP Medical equipment worth FCFA 2.3 billion. 
WFP Several humanitarian flights  
U.S. CDC  Technical Support 
Plan International, IMC, 
NRC, FRC, LWF,  
Handwashing kids to communities; Community engagement, Risk 
communication and awareness; Water sanitation and hygiene; Training of 
community health workers.  
UNICEF Technical and financial support for awareness-raising; Facilitated the revision 
of the MPH’s COVID-19 communication documents  
UNHCR Sensitisation on preventive measures and provision of rapid tests, handwashing, 
temperature checks in refugee camps.  
MSF Enhancing health capacity all over the country (triage, infection prevention and 
control measures, increasing hospital capacity). 
USAID Supported the MINSANTE to model the COVID-19 epidemic to better 
understand and quantify needs. 
British Government  Financial support to  decentralise testing  
IMF Provided credit worth US$ 226 million)   
CSI Distribution of masks and hydroalcoholic gels 
CDC Cameroon  Helped MPH develop COVID-19 preparedness and response plans; Training at 
national and regional levels; Donated laboratory supplies to the Public Health 
Laboratory 
NRC=Norwegian Refugee Council; IMC=International Medical Corps; CERF=Central Emergency Response 
Fund; WFP=World Food Programme; WHO=World Health Organisation; UNDP=United Nations 
Development Programme; OCHA= UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; FRC=French 
Red Cross, LWF=Lutheran World Federation; MSF=Médecins Sans Frontieres; CDC=Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention; CSI=Cameroon Survival Initiative  
Source: Author, compiled from various sources including OCHA (2020), UNAID (2020), 
Cameroon Tribune (2020), MSF (2020), IMF (2020), Ekoka (2020), CDC (2020) 
 
Many humanitarian/international organisations/NGOs have provided technical assistance, to 
the government. For instance, the WHO and many NGOs in collaboration with the MPH have 
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been organising COVID-19 capacity building programmes (workshops and training) for health 
workers in all regions of the country (OCHA, 2020; UNICEF, 2020). Cameroon’s National 
Public Health Laboratory constructed by the CDC is facilitating COVID-19 specimen 
collection, transport, and distribution of coronavirus test kits; reporting of results from the 
decentralised laboratories and assisted to  develop Cameroon’s laboratory plans to decentralise 
the diagnostic capacity of COVID-19 covering all the ten regions (CDC, 2020). Without these 
assistance,  Cameroon may not cope with the response.  
5.2.3 Politicising donations 
Notwithstanding the dire need for assistance to fight COVID-19, there are concerns that the 
government has attempted to choke some donations. For example, the Minister of Territorial 
Administration closed the COVID-19 fundraising accounts of Cameroon’s main opposition 
party—Cameroon Renaissance Movement (MRC) (LeMonde & AFP, 2020). In another 
incident, the Minister of Public Health rejected a donation of 950 Covid-19 screening tests and 
16,000 protective and surgical masks from the MRC. Furthermore, the MRC’s volunteers were 
arrested for distributing free face masks and hand sanitizers in Yaoundé (Allegrozzi, 2020). 
The government claims these measures were taken due to non-compliance with the country’s 
legally prescribed donation process. However, the government received a contribution of FCFA 
20 million ($ 36,100) from the Mfoundi Section of the ruling CPDM party (MPH, 2020b) 
sparking nationwide disquiet on the need for an all-inclusive policy that allows all pollical 
parties to participate in the response to the pandemic.  
 
5.3	 Information	systems	on	the	COVID-19	pandemic	response 
The relevant aspects discussed under this theme are the Public Health Emergency Operations 
Centre, situational awareness and community information dissemination and health education.  
 
5.3.1 Public health emergency operations center (HEOC) 
Cameroon’s operational ability to manage health crises was boosted in 2018 with the inception 
of a  new Public Centre Emergency and Operations (HEOC) in the nation’s capital, Yaoundé—
funded by the US government (Figure 3A). The HEOC with modern state-of-the art equipment 
can serve as Incident Command Centre (ICC) to proffer standard operational procedures (SOPs) 
in managing public health risks, determine and harmonise strategic areas for health 
intervention, support the development and response plans for health hazards, and facilitate the 
integration of health resources (US Embassy, 2018; Emmanuel, 2018). The HEOC has been 
coordinating the COVID-19 pandemic crisis response, serving as the national ICC for the entire 
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nation (CRTV, 2020b). Some regions have also created COVID-19 ICCs (Figure 3B). The 
relevance of regional ICC became more apparent when the government decentralised the 
pandemic response to the regional level. 
 
 
Figure 3: (A) Inauguration ceremony of Cameroon’s PHEOC located in Messa, Yaoundé 
on December 3rd, 2018. Source: Emmanuel (2018); (B) Sign of the Covid-19 Incident 
Command Centre in Bamenda, North-West region. Source: (HRW, 2020).  
 
5.3.2 Situational awareness 
Situational awareness involves active information gathering, analysis, integration, 
interpretation validation and sharing that helps to strengthen public health operational 
ability/capacity to support decision making across critical infrastructure sectors and all levels 
of government before, during and after an incident (Madhav, 2018; ASPR, 2015). The HEOC 
has facilitated situational awareness for the pandemic response through facilitating the 
collection, harmonisation and analysing COVID-19 bio surveillance data across the country 
and updating knowledge on the infection and spread rate of coronavirus. This has been 
facilitating government resource mobilisation, distribution and utilisation. The HEOC has 
played a fundamental role to capture, disseminate and coordinate health information at the 
national and regional levels that has informed governance decision on the evolving COVID-19 
health risks.  
5.3.3 Community information dissemination and health education (CIDHE) 
Community information dissemination and health education (CIDHE) for COVID-19 has been 
done in Cameroon via multiple platforms and channels including TV, radio, print media, flyers, 
posters, the MPH’s website, health facilities, volunteers, community health workers, social 
media, family and friends (IOM, 2020; OCHA, 2020; IPSOS, 2020).  
  B A 
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The messages being disseminated include COVID-19 symptoms, infection, transmission, 
protection, safety, and hygiene measures. (Figure 4; MPH, 2020a; IOM, 2020; OCHA, 2020).  
 
Figure 4: Some CIDHE flyers on the website of Cameroon’s Ministry of Public Health 
The main actors/agencies involved in CIDHE are the MPH, MICOM and several NGOs. 
According to the UN Office of Humanitarian Affairs, around 17,138,607 Cameroonians had 
accessed CIDHE by June 2020 (OCHA, 2020), which is around 66% of Cameroon’s population 
(2019 estimate). An IPSOS survey also found that around 97% of Cameroonians have heard of 
the pandemic (IPSOS, 2020).  
The high population accessibility to CIDHE, however, is not proportionate across the country. 
The availability, easy accessibility, dissemination, and coverage of CIDHE varies. According 
to the IOM just 49% of entry points into Cameroon had COVID-19 information as of April 
2020 (IOM, 2020). In addition, the United Nations estimates that only 46% of the population 
in the conflict-ridden Anglophone Regions have access to information required for the 
prevention of COVID-19 (OCHA, 2020). The evidence also points to conflicting messages 
from the social media. For example, analysis from an IPSOS survey revealed that 
Cameroonians believe Africans cannot be infected with the disease (22%); hot climate prevents 
the spread of COVID-19 (60%); the virus can be  prevented via drinking lemon and vitamin C 
(66%) and that it can be cured with garlic (50%) or drinking bleach (9%) (IPSOS, 2020b). In 
recognition of these myths, the CDC has been engaging with the populations in some regions 
to counteract COVID-19 misinformation (CDC, 2020). Nevertheless, more targeted CIDHE is 
needed to mitigate the impact of these myths.  
 
5.4	 Operational	interventions/service	delivery	for	COVID-19	response 
The sub-themes examined in this section are scaling up service delivery, trust in the health 





5.4.1 Scaling up service delivery 
The authorities have limited ability to scale-up COVID-19 intervention coverage all over the 
country. The difficulty to rapidly expand health system services to accommodate a rise in the 
number of COVID-19 patients is contingent on the poor health infrastructure and the inability 
of the system to deploy enough specialist health personnel and equipment to all the 10 regions. 
Not all the administrative regions have laboratories for testing COVID-19 and the capacity for 
some had been exceeded (OCHA, 2020). Theoretically, the government scaled-up its 
intervention to the entire country through the decentralisation policy as mentioned earlier. The 
appropriate resource to actualise the policy is yet to be provided. Through financial, technical, 
and material assistance from local and international partners, COVID-19 service delivery in 
capacity development and the provision of basic health equipment and PPE is gradually being 
scaled-up in the regions (Bang et al., 2020; UNICEF 2020; Cameroon Tribune, 2020; MSF, 
2020). Despite these efforts, treatment for COVID-19 patients at the regional levels remains 
ineffective due to lack of intensive care units (Bang et al., 2020).  
Although the government has made COVID-19 testing free, the population is still being charged 
for all associated treatment, which is costly. Limited  access to health insurance for 
Cameroonians  and the excessive cost of treatment could be a disincentive to seek  COVID-19 
care (WHO, 2016; HRW, 2020). Even in non-crisis times, 64% of Cameroonians do not seek 
healthcare due to the excessive cost (Nde, et al., 2019).  
 
5.4.2	 Trust	in	the	Health	System		
The evidence suggests that trust in Cameroon’s CIDHE and in the health facilities to treat 
COVID-19 is low. A recent empirical study revealed the Cameroon public lacks complete 
confidence and/or trust in the health system (Bang et al., 2020). This is justified by an earlier 
survey that showed only 55% of Cameroonians trust government’s CIDHE while 45% feel they 
need more information on cure, personal/family protection, how the virus spreads and how 
people can be infected (IPSOS, 2020). Furthermore, there are reports of Cameroonians avoiding 
hospitals for fear of being infected with the virus and hundreds of patients hospitalised for other 
diseases have fled from hospitals for fear of being infected with COVID-19. This was 
confirmed by the Public Health Minister who disclosed that patients fled without completing 
their treatment (Kindzeka, 2020). The authorities need an aggressive public sensitisation 
campaign to change public perception and restore confidence in the health system. Depleting 





5.4.3 Traditional treatment for COVID-19 
Traditional medicine seems to be filling the void created by lack of trust in the health system. 
Cameroonians have been flooding the Douala diocese of the Catholic Church to seek COVID-
19 treatment from an Archbishop (Samuel Kleda,) who claimed to have developed a plant-
based drug for coronavirus and have used it to treat at around 3,000 patients (Kouagheu, 2020). 
The government’s position on the use of non-scientific means to treat coronavirus patients is 
unclear. The Minister of Health cautioned against the use of traditional medicine while the PM 
has articulated support for local efforts to develop endogenous remedies for treating 
coronavirus patients but fell short of encouraging COVID-19 patients to get traditional 
treatment (Tih, 2020). As patients shift away from the health system, there is a higher risk of  
more infections and deaths.  
5.5 Provision of essential commodities/services and logistics 
Whilst instituting border and internal lock-down measures to protect public health, the 
government ensured essential services and goods were available. The restrictive measures 
affected at least 65 points of entry (4 airports and 61 land and blue border crossing) into the 
country (Figure 5). Nevertheless, flights and vessels bringing essential items (food, medication, 
equipment etc.) into the country were not suspended during the border restrictions. The land 
border crossings were only partially closed (3 open, 39 partially open and 33 closed ) to allow 
transportation of goods to Cameroon’s landlocked neighbouring countries (IOM, 2020). This 




Figure 5: Locations of entry points in Cameroon where COVID-19 restrictions were 
imposed. Source: IOM (2020) 
Many Cameroonian truck drivers entering the neighbouring countries tested positive for 
COVID-19. According to the IOM, just around 20% of the entry points into Cameroon were 
screening travelers for COVID-19 (IOM, 2020). To resolve the problem, Cameroon and Chad 
held talks and agreed to harmonise COVID-19 testing methods for truck drivers in both 
countries, and to issue them with test certificate that will be recognised by both countries 
(OCHA, 2020).  
Public transport in Cameroon was not suspended during the lockdown. The rationale was to 
enable easy circulation of essential services, including health personnel/services  and avoid any 
disruption in the supply chain that would further harm the economy. The transport sector, 
however, was mandated to follow social distancing measures like overloading of vehicles and 
wearing face masks.  
To ensure the justice system continued to function smoothly during the pandemic, a  
presidential decree on April 15, 2020 ordered the release of hundreds of prisoners all over the 
country. Nevertheless, there are allegations that the government continued to arrest and 
imprison people with minor offences including those exercising their rights to freedom (Offner, 
2020). Furthermore, concerns have been raised that sufficient attention has not been given to 
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the needs of the most vulnerable and marginalised people in society like the thousands of IDPs 
from the Anglophone armed conflict and refugees (OCHA, 2020).  
6.0 DISCUSSION 
Timely response was required to prevent the rapidly evolving and unprecedented coronavirus 
infections from spiraling out of control in Cameroon. The first detected cases in early March 
were in Douala, Yaoundé and Bafoussam. Had the government sealed off these towns 
immediately, the virus spread could have been contained. Swift governance actions after 
outbreak detection of infectious diseases help mitigate the overall effects of the disease 
(Madhav, 2018; Brattberg & Rhinard, 2011). 
From a public heath perspective, the government can be applauded for the strict infection 
prevention measures. It was difficult to promulgate a strict lockdown considering much thought 
was not given on managing public expectations and balancing concerns due to the potential 
socio-economic ramifications to livelihoods (Mbopi-Keou et al., 2020). Cameroon is not a 
welfare state that can financially support its citizens if they are prevented to generate income 
since around 90% of Cameroon’s labour force is trapped in the  informal sector where the wages 
are lowest (Kouete, 2020). Attempts to enforce a full and strict lockdown without state support 
could lead to civil unrest.  
The resource limitations experienced during the pandemic and government’s inability to scale-
up intervention coverage to accommodate a rise in the number of COVID-19 patients is 
associated to the poor state of Cameroon’s health infrastructure/system. Pre-emptive 
preparedness measures would enable easy accessibility to basic medical materials than can be 
purchased from external sources at the onset of a pandemic.  
To ensure sustainable financing during pandemics, Cameroon needs to have risk-based 
insurance schemes  to  circumvent the tradition of relying on foreign aid/assistance, which is 
not guaranteed as donors may also be experiencing significant financial constraints. For 
instance, the UK foreign aid budget was recently axed by £3bn due to the economic downturn 
caused by COVOD-19 (Crag, 2020). 
Over-centralisation of COVID-19 response has implications for containing the virus at the 
regional/local levels. Rather, strengthening the capacity to identify and diagnose cases at 
local/community levels would rapidly reduce infection spread. Indeed, decentralised pandemic 
response is an ideal strategy for effective mitigation of virus spread (Brattberg & Rhinard, 2011; 
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Madhav, 2018). Nevertheless, the community health facilities/units must be empowered to deal 
with the pandemic.  
Politicising and refusing donations from opposition political parties during a crisis when 
resources are needed is unwise. Crisis governance that inculcates cross-party collaboration 
should not be seen as the erosion of state power and authority. Opposition parties wishing  to 
assist during a pandemic should not be viewed as potential usurpers of state power. Laying 
claim to exclusive authority in crisis situations while unable to meet expectations would instead 
expose authority deficits. An all-inclusive policy/approach to a novel health crisis like COVID-
19 would facilitate the response.  
Effective communication to the public that is clear, concise with targeted messages is a central 
pillar of crisis governance. Public communication under unpredictable situations can create 
anxiety and apprehension for the government as the authorities scramble to contain the 
pandemic while also communicating with the public on-the-go. Nonetheless, a key focus on 
CIDHE should be on understanding the messages and targeting the most vulnerable people.  
Some infection social control measures are an elusive and unrealistic options for most 
communities where traditionally, people share common social spaces. Moreover, the 
inconsistent supply of clean water in most urban and rural areas makes hygienic infection 
control measures requiring regular had washing unrealistic. Furthermore, poverty is a hindrance 
to use soap and hand sanitizers as infection control measures.  
The governments must contend with the issue of dissipating trust in the health care service. 
This can be achieved by providing easily understandable narratives and/or expressing 
reassurance to the population regularly; accurate information dissemination; expressing 
empathy in messages and anticipatory/measured public communication outings of both 
desirable and undesirable outcomes (Ola & Zeger, 2020).  
So far, Cameroon has been able to sustain the COVID-19 pandemic, thanks to  the country’s 
foreign policy. As the number of cases continue to rise one wonders whether the country would 
avoid the catastrophic consequences of the pandemic. This article makes a modest contribution 
to the knowledge on the state of the pandemic five months into the crisis and proffer suggestions 
(see Table 2) for improvement in governance to avoid  potentially calamitous consequences as 
the pandemic accelerates.  
7.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
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The orientation of this research and the structure of this article is underpinned by the six SBBs 
of the Institutional Systems in the CPRMS model. The coronavirus  pandemic constitutes an 
unprecedented challenge to Cameroon’s healthcare system and the government has 
demonstrated commitment to combat the virus through the implementation of several crisis 
responses instruments and strategies albeit much still must be done to get the virus under 
control.  
 
The findings have revealed significant governance challenges intimately linked to the fragile 
state of Cameroon’s healthcare infrastructure, which casts a huge shadow over the country’s  
ability to treat a highly infectious disease like COVID-19. Some governance measures 
employed to tackle the pandemic leaves much to be desired. Identified constraints exist in the 
country’s healthcare facilities, resources (financial, human, material) especially in the provision 
of intensive care for coronavirus patients; centralisation of the response and scaling up 
interventions in all the regions; politicising contributions from opposition parties, CIDHE that 
has not sufficiently targeted the vulnerable populace, high cost to access COVID-19 health 
care; and insufficient trust in the health sector with implications for diverting to traditional 
treatment for COVID-19.  
Currently, one can only speculate on the pandemic’s trajectory but there is no doubt that the 
threat posed by pandemics has the potential to cause socio-economic turbulence in Cameroon 
as infections increase and a second wave is predicted. This signals a need for urgent action to 
bring the virus spread under control.  
The identified limitations in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic requires Cameroon to 
realise that the time is ripe for a paradigm shift in its health system model. The severity of the 
threat that a pandemic of this caliber possess justifies the need for an overhaul of the public 
health infrastructure including institutional capacity for pandemic response  in anticipation of  
subsequent health related crisis. Whilst his would be a slow process even under the most 
optimistic assumptions, political will to initiate change is the first step needed.  
Table 4 has recommendations on how to improve the identified challenges in the pandemic 







Table 4: Recommendations on how to improve COVID-19 pandemic response and 
subsequent pandemic crises management in Cameroon.  








• The president should address the nation immediately at the onset of a crisis to show that topmost 
leadership is taking control of the situation.  

























• Need to develop multisectoral pandemic risk assessments. 
• Strategic decision-making meetings/committees should have more social scientists to gauge the 
societal impacts of measures taken.  
• After initial cases are detected, containment measures should be swift to prevent disease spread.  
• Public health safety should be prioritised in decisions to ease lockdown measures to avoid 
infection rates from rising.  
• Government should institute a national legislative framework and policy on epidemic/pandemic 
crisis management that would guide the actions/activities of decision makers/administrators.  
• Psychological care should be provided for COVID-19 patients and their families. 
• A data collection and analysis system are needed to check how social measures and public health 
measures meet local COVID-19 conditions 













• The government should inform the populace of changes in its briefing program/schedules to 
avoid speculations.  
• Providing clear, concise, and regularly updated information is vital to gain public trust and 
confidence. 
• Since Cameroon is bilingual (English and French), briefings done in one of the languages should 









n • The decentralisation of COVID-19 measures should be provided institutional and legislative support at the regional and local levels.  
• To operationalise the decentralised management of COVID-19, the required financial, technical, 
and material resources should be assessed and made available at the regional levels.  
• The government should build on its coronavirus decentralisation policy to operationalise the 




























 • The health infrastructure should be upgraded with more specialist units of larger capacity.  
• Health facilities with specialist units should be provided in all the regions.  
• Qualified/specialist health staff should be distributed to key health facilities in all the regions 
during a pandemic.  
• More health staff/personnel with adequate training required in the regions. 
• Employ modelling techniques to foster the quantification of pandemic health-care needs  

















• Ensure all health districts have regular supply of protective and preventive gear and critical 
equipment.  
• Regularly publish updated list of all contributions to ensure accountability. 
• The diagnostic capacity for infections should be enhanced in the entire country for more accurate 
monitoring of disease spread.  
• Contingency plans involving stockpiling of critical materials/medicines would ease patient care 
at the onset of an epidemic/pandemic.  
• Need to boost local industry capacity to produce essential equipment like face masks, PPE during 
a health crisis.  








 • The government should not politicise crises and prevent opposition parties from helping.  
•  Donations from opposition parties should not be rejected when desperately needed.  













• Incident Command Centers should be set up in all the regional capitals to facilitate crisis 
management at the regional levels.  
Situational 
Awareness 
• The government should scale-up bio surveillance and laboratory testing for infection in all 
regions.  
• Government should improve its information management ability by harmonising data collection 
and validation process. 
• Harmonisation and equal geographic distribution of testing capacity is needed.  
• Need for more correct and prompt data collection, analysis, and consolidation reporting 
CIDHE 
• More investment in community sensitisation, health education and mobilization to prevent 
COVID-19 infections is needed. 
• More effort should be made to provide CIDHE to the most vulnerable populace during a health 
crisis.  







































• The health system should have the ability to redistribute specialist health personnel and 
equipment during an epidemic/pandemic. 
• Scaling up of COVID-19 service delivery to the regions should be associated with an assessment 
of needs and the provision of appropriate resources.  
• The cost to access COVID-19 treatment should be free or s subsidised by the government.  
Trust 
• Trust building in the populace is needed to encourage more health care access for COVID-19 
and the continuation of treatment for other diseases. 
Traditional 
Treatment 
• There should be a clear policy on accessing traditional treatment and the government should visa 




• More rigorous screening for infections is needed on the land borders, especially for transporters.  
• There should be a clear policy to release prisoners during a pandemic, which should prioritise 
the most vulnerable prisoners.  
• The needs of the most vulnerable Cameroonians should be prioritised when instituting restrictive 
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